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Conditioning of Relief From Unenforceable Judgment 
Upon Showing of Meritorious Defense to Claim 
Upon Which It Was Entered Can Deny Due 
Process of Law-Armstrong v. Manzo* 
When petitioner and his wife were divorced in 1959 she received 
custody of their minor daughter, and he was ordered to contribute 
fifty dollars per month toward the child's support. The wife re-
married and, two years after the divorce, joined in proceedings ini-
tiated by her new husband in a Texas court to adopt the child.1 
The adoption petition alleged that, during the two-year period, 
petitioner had failed to support the child in a manner commen-
surate with his ability.2 Under Texas law, proof of such a charge 
• 380 U.S. 545 (1965). 
I. The wife joined the proceedings to indicate her consent to the adoption. Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 n.l (1965) (hereinafter cited as principal case). Prior to 
commencement of the adoption proceedings, the wife filed an affidavit with the 
juvenile court of appropriate jurisdiction alleging that petitioner had not contributed 
to the support of his minor daughter for a period of two years. Upon the basis of 
this statement, the juvenile-court judge issued his consent to adoption, Evidence of 
this fact was filed along with the request for adoption later the same day in the 
District Court of El Paso County, Texas. Petitioner knew neither of the pendency 
of the adoption proceeding nor of his wife's action in obtaining the juvenile court 
judge's consent. Principal case at 547-48; see generally note 3 infra, 
2, At the time of the divorce, petitioner was ordered to pay fifty dollars per month 
into the Child Support Office of Tarrant County, Texas, for his daughter's main• 
tenance until she reached eighteen years of age or until the divorce court directed 
otherwise. Apparently only two hundred dollars was so paid during the twenty• 
eight months between the rendition of the divorce decree and the commencement 
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against a natural father makes his consent to the adoption of his 
child unnecessary.8 Petitioner, however, knew nothing of the pro-
ceedings until immediately after a final decree of.adoption had been 
entered, whereupon he moved to vacate the judgment.4 His motion 
was denied because of his failure to demonstrate that he had sup-
ported his daughter to the extent required to preserve the right 
to withhold consent to her adoption.5 The Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals affirmed, holding that any defect in the adoption proceed-
ing caused by petitioner's lack of knowledge was cured when his 
motion to vacate came on for hearing and he was then afforded the 
opportunity to show that he had supported the child and that, there-
fore, his consent to adoption was in fact necessary. 6 On appeal to 
the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. If one is not 
bound by a judgment because he had no knowledge of the pro-
ceeding in which it was rendered, he is denied due process of law 
if his right to reopen that decree is conditioned upon his carrying 
a burden of-proof greater than that which would have been imposed 
on him in the original proceeding. 
The due process clauses,of the fifth and fourteenth amendments 
of the adoption proceeding. See In re Armstrong, 371 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1963). 
3. TEX. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. art. 46(1)(6) (1956): "[N]o adoption shall be permitted 
except with the written consent of the living parents of the child; provided, however, 
that if a living parent •.• shall voluntarily abandon and desert a child sought to be 
adopted, for a period of two (2) years • . • or • • • shall have not contributed sub-
stantially to the support of such child during such period .•. commensurate with his 
financial ability, • • • it shall not be necessary to obtain the written consent of the 
• • • parent ••• in such default, and in such cases adoption shall be permitted on the 
written consent of the Judge of the Juvenile Court of the county of such child's 
residence . • . ." In the principal case, the consent of the juvenile-court judge was 
apparently obtained without any hearing, solely on the basis of an affidavit filed by 
petitioner's wife alleging that he had failed to support his· daughter. See note 1 supra. 
4. The terms "decree" and "judgment" are used interchangeably herein to refer 
to the final decisions of both law and equity courts. 
Texas procedure permits a judgment to be vacated upon a motion for a new 
trial filed with the court of rendition within thirty days after the judgment is ren-
dered. Thereafter, unless a defendant obtains a writ of error preparatory to an appeal, 
relief from a judgment must be obtained in an action in equity by way of a bill of 
review. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329(b). This procedure apparently applies regardless of whether 
the defect in the judgment under attack is apparent on its face, although the procedure 
is limited to cases in which the rendering court had "jurisdictional power" to enter 
the judgment. See McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961), noted 
in 40 TEXAS L. REv. 905 (1962). 
5. The procedure followed by the trial court in considering petitioner's motion 
for a new trial was consistent with the Texas rule that a judgment not invalid on 
its face will be set aside only upon a petitioner's showing that he has a meritorious 
defense to the cause of action upon which the decree was entered. McEwen v. Har-
rison, supra note 4; see generally notes 21-30 infra and accompanying text. 
6. In re Armstrong, 371 S.W .2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); accord, Carpenter v. 
Forshee, 103 Ga. App. 758, 120 S.E.2d 786 (1961); Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, · 
6 N.E. 830 (1886); In re Davis, 141 Misc. 681, 255 N.Y. Supp. 416 (Surr. Ct. 1932); 
DeWitt v. Brooks, 182 S.W,2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). 
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prohibit the taking of property by judicial action unless its owner 
has been afforded a fair opportunity to defend his interest.7 Thus, 
a final decree purporting to affect the property of one who did not 
have sufficient knowledge of the pendency of the proceeding in 
which it was rendered is not binding upon him.8 If it is a judgment 
at law it can be attacked in the court which entered it or in equity 
in the same jurisdiction as well as at law or in equity in any juris-
diction where some step is taken to enforce it.9 Similarly, an equity 
decree is always subject to attack in some manner in the jurisdiction 
where it was rendered or where it is sought to be enforced.10 
Although children cannot be classified as "property,"11 adoption 
proceedings, which can permanently deprive a natural parent of all 
rights over his child, are subject to due process limitations; thus, 
a final adoption order does not bind a parent who had no knowledge 
of the pendency of the proceeding in which it was rendered.12 
. A person purportedly affected by a judgment which cannot con-
7. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Milliken 
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1937); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1913). 
8. Milliken v. Meyer, supra note 7. 
9. A distinction is generally drawn between attacks on judgments initiated in the 
court which entered a decree and instituted specifically to avoid enforcement of the 
decree and those raised in a court other than the one rendering the judgment and 
not instituted for the express purpose of defeating it. The former are termed "direct 
attacks"; the latter are called "collateral." See generally 1 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 252 
(2d ed. 1902); I FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 306 (5th ed. 1925); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS 
§ 11, comment a (1942); Note, 66 YALE L.J. 526 (1957). When a domestic judgment 
is valid on its face, collateral attack may not be permitted. See, e.g., Lampson Lumber 
Co. v. Hoer, 139 Conn. 294, 93 A.2d 143 (1952); Johnson v. Hayes Cal. Builders Inc., 
60 Cal. 2d 572, 35 Cal. Rptr. 618, 387 P .2d 394 (1963); .Bynum v. Davis, 327 S.W.2d 
674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Prewitt v. Prewitt, 397 Ill. 178, 73 N.E,2d 312 (1947). 
But see.Steffens v. Steffens, 408 Ill. 150, 96 N.E.2d 458 (1951) (exception to the general 
rule; defendant prevented from appearing by fraud or wholly without fault on his 
part); Porter v. Orient Ins. Co., 72 Conn. 519, 527, 45 Atl. 7 (1900) (exception to the 
general rule in Connecticut prohibiting collateral attack on judgments regular on 
their face where defendant against whom default judgment was entered is a non• 
resident). Contra, Ross v. Ross, 215 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct. 1961); State v. Wilson, 
181 Ark. 683, 27 S.W.2d 106 (1930). The limitation on collateral attack does not ex-
tend, however, to foreign judgments, which may be attacked collaterally at any time 
whether or not void on their face. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
If a jurisdiction forbidding collateral attack upon a domestic judgment valid on 
its face also prohibits vacation of such judgments after a given statutory period 
(see note 17 infra) relief may be available only by way of a bill in equity to enjoin 
enforcement of the decree, or by way of a bill of review. A distinction is sometimes 
made between equitable relief by way of a bill of review and that by means of an 
injunction, the former being characterized as a direct attack, and the latter as 
collateral. See generally I FREEMAN, op. cit. supra § 312. 
10. See Corbett v. Craven, 196 Mass. 319, 82 N.E. 37 (1907). Of course an attack 
upon an equity decree will normally be made in an action in equity. An exception to 
this rule might arise if a judgment creditor by virtue of an equity decree granting 
money damages sought to enforce it in an action at law in another jurisdiction. 
11. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952) (dissenting opinion). 
12. See Child Sav. Institute v. Knobel, 327 Mo. 609, 37 S.W.2d 290 (1931); cf. May 
v. Anderson, supra note 11. 
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stitutionally bind him, but who does not know of its existence or 
chooses not to challenge the decree until the alleged judgment credi-
tor attempts to satisfy it, normally attacks the judgment either by 
moving to prevent the discovery or attachment of his assets for 
execution or, if the would-be creditor brings a suit to enforce the 
judgment in a jurisdiction other than that in which it was rendered, 
by demonstrating that the judgment is unenforceable.18 To attack 
successfully in either situation, the alleged judgment debtor gener-
ally must only prove that the proceedings in which the decree was 
handed down were constitutionally defective.14 
No action is necessary to satisfy a judgment in some instances, 
as for example in the principal case, where the petitioner's ex-wife 
and her new husband had custody of the child even before the unen-
forceable adoption decree was entered. Sometimes an apparent 
judgment debtor does not wish to wait for his alleged creditor to 
commence enforcement proceedings but prefers to remove the rec-
ord lien upon his property created by the docketed but impotent 
decree as quickly as possible. In these situations the party pur-
portedly bound by the judgment must set the stage for attack. A 
motion to vacate, filed in the court which entered the decree, is one 
common means toward this end.15 If such a judgment is challenged 
because of a jurisdictional defect in the proceeding from which it 
arose (including lack of sufficient notice to the one purportedly 
bound) and the infirmity appears on the face of the decree, it is 
deemed void, and the motion to vacate is generally granted at any 
time as a matter of course.16 When no jurisdictional defect is appar-
ent on the face of the judgment, and the decree is thus merely 
voidable, relief by way of a motion to vacate is often available only 
' 13. See generally I FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 306-16; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 
526 (1957). For a summary of the -methods of enforcing a judgment in a jurisdiction 
other than that in which it was rendered, as well as a discussion of the difficulties raised 
where an unenforceable judgment is sought to be executed in another jurisdiction in 
the manner provided by the Federal Judicial Code, see Note, 64 MICH. L. REv. 521 
(1966). 
14. See, e.g., Jones v. Watts, 142 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1944) (by implication); Cochran 
v. Whitworth, 21 Ga. App. 406, 94 S.E. 609 (1917); Kennedy v. Boden, 241 Mo. App. 
86, 231 S.W .2d 862 (1950) (by implication). In a few jurisdictions a motion to quash 
an attachment for execution is treated similarly to a petition for equitable relief from 
a judgment. See, e.g., Davis v. Bank of Atkins, 205 Ark. 144, 167 S.W.2d 876 (1943). In 
these states one seeking to prevent attachment may have to show that he has a meri-
torious defense to the claim upon which the judgment sought to be executed was . 
based. See generally note 21 infra and accompanying text. · 
15. Relief from equity decrees is treated in much the same manner as that from 
judgments at law. See generally I FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 9, § 212; 3 id. § 1191. 
16. See, e.g., Wise v. Herzog, 144 F.2d 486 (D.C. Ct. App. 1940); Preston v. Denkins, 
94 Ariz. 214,219,382 P.2d 686, 689 (1963); Meyers v. Washington, 211 Cal. App. 2d 767, 
27 Cal. Rptr. 778 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Clark v. Clark, 191 Kan. 95, 379 P.2d 240 
(1963) (statute so providing); Langer v. Wiehl, 207 Misc. 826, 140 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. 
Ct. 1955). 
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if the motion is mad~ within a reasonable time, or within a limited 
period prescribed by statute.17 When relief cannot be obtained by 
way of a motion to vacate, equity may provide the only effective 
forum for the alleged judgment debtor who wishes to take the first 
step toward bringing to issue the question of the enforceability of the 
decree against him even if it were rendered at law.18 His relief would 
then come either by way of an injunction against enforcement of the 
judgment or, if he began the equitable proceeding by filing a form 
of a bill of review, by way of an order "setting aside" the judgment.10 
Except when a void judgment is attacked on a motion to vacate,20 
one who challenges a final judgment before an attempt is made to 
satisfy it can generally obtain legal or equitable relief only if he pre-
sents a "meritorious defense" to the cause of action upon which the 
decree was rendered, in addition to demonstrating the deficiency in 
the proceeding from which it arose.21 The meritorious-defense pre-
17. See, e.g., In re Estrem's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 563, 107 P.2d 36 (1940) (reasonable 
time); Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 382 P .2d 910 (1963) (reasonable time); Corporate 
Loan & Sec. Co. v. Peterson, 64 Wash. 2d 241, 391 P.2d 199 (1964) (one year statutory 
period whether judgment void or voidable). The status of the law in Texas is dis-
cussed in note 4 supra. 
18. In a few states it may also be necessary for one wishing to prevent attachment 
of his assets for execution to get equitable relief, See note 14 supra. In these juris-
dictions the textual discussion relative to the rules for equitable relief for one who 
takes the first step in bringing the question of the enforceability of judgment against 
him to issue would be applicable to the party seeking relief from an attachment, even 
though the would-be judgment creditor, by attaching, took the initial step in bring• 
ing the enforceability of the judgment into question. 
19. There is some diversity of opinion as to whether the legal remedy must be 
inadequate before equitable relief will be granted. In some instances, equitable relief 
has been granted despite the existence of an adequate legal remedy. See, e.g., Watkins 
v. Perry, 25 Colo. App. 425, 139 P. 551 (1914); City of Chicago Heights v. Public Serv. 
Co. of No. Ill., 345 Ill. App. 393, 103 N.E.2d 519, transf. 408 Ill. 310, 97 N.E.2d 268 
(1952); Shinn v. Shinn, 148 Neb. 832, 29 N.W.2d 629 (1947). The majority of courts, 
however, require that the legal remedy be inadequate or unavailable before equitable 
relief will be granted. See, e.g., Harpke v. Lankerskin Estate, 101 Cal, App. 2d 49, 224 
P.2d 889 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Denning v. Van Meter, 281 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1955), 
. Where a petitioner was negligent or at fault in failing to appear in the original 
proceeding equitable relief may be denied despite the fact that he was not adequately 
served with process. Kibbe v. Benson, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 624 (1873). Moreover, a prior 
adverse decision on a motion to set aside a judgment made in the court which en• 
tered the decree in which the court determined it had jurisdiction in the original 
proceeding may preclude relief. See American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 
(1932). 
20. See notes 15 and 16 supra and cases cited. 
21. See, e.g., Murphree v. International Shoe Co., 246 Ala. 384, 20 So. 2d 782 (1945); 
Alexander v. Jones, 233 Ark. 708, 346 S.W.2d 692 (1961); Nasti v. Cook City, 348 Ill. 
342, 180 N.E. 847 (1932); Braun v. Quinn, 112 Neb. 483, 199 N.W. 828 (1925); Gray 
v. Cholodenko, 31. N.J. Super. 190, 111 A.2d 918 (1955); Gibbons v. Sommers, 155 
N.E.2d 528 (Ohio C.P. 1957). Compare Ray v. Carr, 71 App. D.C. 37, 107 F.2d 238 
(D.C. Ct. App. 1940), with Wise v. Herzog, 72 App. D.C. 335, 114 F.2d 486 (D.C. Ct, App. 
1940). A substantial minority of courts, however, do not require a meritorious defense, 
See, e.g., Stafford v. Dickison, 374 P.2d 665 (Hawaii 1962); Johnson v. J. A. Barrett Auto 
Co., 51 Idaho 95, 4 P.2d 344 (1931); Holcomb v. Creech, 247 Ky. 199, 56 S.W.2d 998 
(1933); Monroe v. Niven, 221 N.C. 362, 20 S.E.2d 311 (1942), The authors of the Restate-
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requisite is a logical outgrowth of two traditional assumptions: that 
a petition for relief from a final judgment is addressed to the court's 
discretion, and that if relief is granted a new trial on the merits of 
the underlying claim will follow.22 The courts reason that if a peti-
tioner has no meritorious defense to the allegations in his would-be 
judgment creditor's original complaint, the new trial following 
annulment of the challenged decree would again terminate in a 
judgment adverse to him. Therefore he is not prejudiced, and the 
judicial process is not employed toward a futile end, if the original 
judgment is permitted to stand.23 
Generally a defense is deemed meritorious when it is such that, 
had it been raised prior to the entry of the judgment under attack, 
the litigation from which that decree arose might have ended favor-
ably to the attacking party.24 If this test were applied literally where 
the challenged judgment was obtained by default-and many con-
stitutionally unenforceable decrees are taken by default25-the issue 
ment prefer the minority position. See REsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 130, comment d 
(1942). Some courts require a meritorious defense only when extrinsic evidence is 
necessary to show the invalidity of the challenged judgment. See, e.g., Honneycutt v. 
Severin, 186 Okla. 509, 98 P .2d 1093 (1940); Nail v. Gene Biddle Feed Co., 347 S.W .2d 
830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (limiting opinion to motion to vacate). 
22. See Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 331 (1813) (Marshall, C.J.); 
Anderson v. Coker, 364 S.W .2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Lake v. Lake, 63 Wyo. 375, 
182 P .2d 824 (1947). These assumptions evidently have no validity when an alleged 
judgment debtor files a motion to vacate a decree on the basis of a defect apparent 
on its face or when he seeks to prevent the would-be judgment creditor from enforc-
ing it. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text. 
23. See Carpenter v. Forshee, 103 Ga. App. 758, 120 S.E.2d 786 (1961); Braun v. 
Quinn, 112 Neb. 485, 199 N.W. 828 (1925). · 
24. A defense is usually considered "meritorious" if it raises a genuine issue of 
material fact bearing upon the respective rights of the parties. See, e.g., Lake v. Lake, 
63 Wyo. 375, 182 P.2d 824 (1947); Elstermeyer v. City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 421, 120 
P.2d 599 (1942). Some courts require a defense which would "probably" have prevailed 
had it been presented at trial. See, e.g., Tootle v. Ellis, 63 Kan. 422, 65 P. 675 (1901); 
Murrell v. Sapulpa, 148 Okla. 16, 297 P. 241 (1931); Anderson v. Coker, 364 S.W.2d 
481 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). In some jurisdictions, the allegations of a defense can be 
meritorious only if they are supported by evidence. See Davis v. Bank of Atkins, 205 
Ark. 144, 167 S.W.2d 876 (1943); McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 
(1961). 
25. The term "constitutional unenforceability" is used herein in reference to a 
decree which is not binding under the federal constitution. Denial of due process in 
civil proceedings is a common cause of constitutionally unenforceable judgments. See, 
e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. _13 (1928); Kurland, The 
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State 
Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958). Lack of due process in such cases generally 
arises from want of notice of judicial proceedings to a defendant purportedly bound 
by them or an attempted extension of a court's jurisdiction over the person of a de-
fendant beyond that permitted under the Constitution. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). See generally 
KAUPER, CONsnTIJTIONAL LAw 984-98 (2d ed. 1960, Supp. 1965). Where the constitu-
tional defect is want of notice to a defendant, his default is the logical result. When 
a court improperly attempts to extend its jurisdiction over his person, a defendant 
may appear and contest jurisdiction and, if his contention should fail, a judgment 
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in the principal case would not arise. If a defendant fails to appear, 
the plaintiff can normally obtain a default judgment on the basis 
of his complaint alone, without introducing evidence to support its 
allegations. Only when the defendant does appear, even if merely 
to deny the charges in the complaint, must the plaintiff usually go 
fonvard with some evidence to substantiate his assertions.20 There-
fore, as the situation exists at the moment a default decree is en-
tered, with the basis of plaintiff's recovery lying only in the allega-
tions of his pleadings, defendant's mere denial may be adequate to 
alter the outcome of the litigation and thus sufficient to meet the 
test of a meritorious defense. His denial at the time he seeks to 
reopen puts him in the same position in relation to his adversary 
as he would have been in had he denied the allegations of the com-
plaint prior to the default. 
Some courts, following this strict interpretation of the meri-
torious-defense test, hold that a denial of a material portion of the 
complaint upon which a default judgment was entered does consti-
tute a sufficient ground for granting relief to the defaulting party 
who seeks to reopen the decree after showing that the proceedings 
from which it arose were constitutionally defective.27 Many courts, 
however, are apparently willing to presume that, had the attacking 
party appeared in those proceedings and denied the allegations of 
the complaint, the plaintiff would have come forward with at least 
some evidence to substantiate them. Doubtless this assumption 
would be valid in many cases. Nevertheless, according to the teach-
ing of the principal case this supposition may not serve, as it tradi-
tionally has, as an excuse for deviating from the strict interpretation 
entered by tbat court is constitutionally enforceable. See Baldwin v. Iowa State 
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). If his objection is sustained, the court 
will dismiss the case against him. Cf. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire &: Rubber 
Co., 285 Fed. 214 (6tb Cir. 1922). If a defendant appears and does not contest the 
court's jurisdiction over him, he waives any right to complain later. Union Bond &: 
Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 S.D. 600, 269 N.W. 474 (1936); see FED. R, C1v. P, 12(h). 
But see Muscek v. Equitable Sav. &: Loan Ass'n, 25 Wash. 2d 546, 171 P.2d 856 (1946). 
26, See, e.g., Haller v. Walczak, 347 Mich. 292, 79 N.W.2d 622 (1956); Irving v. 
Rodriguez, 27 Ill. App. 2d 75, 169 N.E.2d 145 (1960); Steiner v. Roberts, 131 N.E.2d 
238 (Ohio App. 1955). But see Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 173 A.2d 1 (1961) (require-
ment of evidence discretionary witb tbe court). Contra, Associates Discount Corp. v. 
Downs, 162 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 1964); Imperial Discount Corp. v. Aiken, 238 N.Y.S.2d 
269, 38 Misc. 2d 187 (Civ. Ct. 1963). Evidence is generally necessary, however, to fix 
the amount of recovery in an action for unliquidated damages, despite a complete 
default by the defendant. See, e.g., Rappazzo v. Nardacd, 198 N.Y.S.2d 357, 20 Misc. 
2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Leach v. Cassity's Estate, 279 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), 
Evidence is also required before a plaintiff in an action to quiet title may obtain a 
default. See cases cited note 33 infra. 
27. Blair v. Blair, 48 Ariz. 501, 62 P.2d 1321 (1936) (specific denial); Ferrier v. 
Morris, 109 Colo. 154, 122 P .2d 880 (1942) (general denial); Tawney v. Blankenship, 
150 Kan. 41, 90 P.2d 1111 (1939) (general denial); Savage v. Cannon, 204 S.C. 478, 80 
S.W.2d 70 (1944) (general denial); Smalley v. Lasell, 26 S.D. 239, 128 N.W. 131 (1910) 
(specific denial). 
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of the meritorious-defense test where a challenged judgment is con-
stitutionally unenforceabl~.28 Under the most prevalent type of 
deviation, a defaulting party is not permitted to rest upon a mere 
denial of the assertions in the original complaint when attacking 
a decree entered on the basis of these charges, but rather is required 
to "show the nature of his defense" by setting out the facts which 
cause him to deny the allegations.29 The procedure condemned in 
the principal case involved an even more dramatic deviation. In a 
hearing upon his motion to vacate the adoption decr~e entered after 
proceedings of which he had no knowledge prior to their conclu-
sion, petitioner was forced t9 demonstrate that he had supported 
his daughter to such an extent that his consent was a prerequisite 
to her adoption. He therefore introduced oral and written evidence, 
not merely to show that he had good cause to believe that he had 
properly maintained the child, but to prove that he had in fact 
supported her to the best of his ability. In other words, he sought 
to disprove a significant allegation in the request for adoption to 
the effect that he had not met his obligation to contribute. Yet, if 
petitioner had appeared in the adoption proceedings, his ex-wife 
and her new husband, as the moving parties, would have been 
charged with the burden of proof on the support issue.30 
The holding in the principal case is merely a refinement 0£ the 
well-settled constitutional doctrine that a judgment which was ren-
dered in a proceeding the pendency 0£ which was not known to the 
alleged judgment debtor is not binding upon him. The Supreme 
Court simply made it clear that such a judgment cannot even put 
him in a "position [different from that which] he would have occu-
pied had due process [i.e., notice] been accorded to him in the 
first place."81 Followed strictly, this rationale would prohibit resort 
to the procedure discussed above whereby an apparent judgment 
debtor seeking to set aside a default judgment obtained in consti-
tutionally• defective proceedings is required to allege ,some facts to 
28. In holding that a mere denial of the allegations of the complaint in the action 
upon which the challenged judgment was entered does not constitute a meritorious 
defense, courts speak of the need for factual assertions or evidence to support the 
denial, so that it can be ascertained whether the attacking party would have prevailed 
in the original proceedings. See Roy v. Scales, 77 Ind. App. 619, 133 N.E. 924 (1922); 
Lott v. Owyang, 90 N.E.2d 604 (Ohio App. 1949). Such a requirement makes sense only 
if the court is presuming that, had the attacking party appeared in the original pro-
ceedings and denied the allegations in his adversary's complaint, the latter would 
have introduced enough evidence to avoid a nonsuit. 
29. E.g., Murphree v. International Shoe Co., 246 Ala. 384, 20 So. 2d 782 (1945); 
Davis v. Bank of Atkins, 205 Ark. 144, 167 S.W.2d 876 (1943); Gray v. Moore, 172 
S.W.2d 746, 751 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). 
30. See Ex parte Payne, 301 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Jones v. Willson, 
285 S.W .2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Lee v. Purvin, 285 S.W .2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1955). 
31. Principal case at 552. 
734 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64 
support his denial of the charges in his would-be creditor's original 
complaint, when a mere denial in the original proceeding would 
have sufficed to force the creditor, as plaintiff, to go forward with 
evidence. Although the Court's language could be limited to the 
facts of the principal case, which indicate that petitioner was called 
upon to do much more than simply indicate his reasons for denying 
a material allegation in the request for adoption, an important con-
sideration suggests that it should indeed be applied literally. An 
apparent judgment debtor who moves to annul a decree entered 
after constitutionally defective proceedings as soon as he learns of 
the decree may not know the precise facts upon which he can or 
will rely in defending his adversary's claim, but may feel confident 
that the claim is invalid and that it can be successfully opposed after 
a time-consuming investigation. His credit should not be impaired 
in the interim by a seemingly valid judgment of record. 
On the other hand, a hearing on a motion to reopen, vacate, 
or set aside a judgment or to enjoin its execution would only be 
governed by the rule of the principal case if the proceedings in 
_which it was entered were constitutionally deficient. Thus, where 
a party attacks a judgment on the ground that the service of process 
was defective as a matter of local law, if the service was nevertheless 
sufficient to apprise him of the pendency of an action against him, 
a court would not be precluded from requiring him to allege or 
prove facts of his case in order to gain relief from a default. Simi-
larly, when an attacking party cannot honestly deny the allegations 
of the complaint upon which the challenged judgment rests, but 
instead offers an affirmative defense to the charges, a court could 
weigh the legal sufficiency of his pleading. It could do as much on 
a demurrer or a motion to strike if the same defense had been 
asserted in the proceedings from which the decree arose.82 
In some proceedings, such as suits to quiet title, a plaintiff gen-
erally cannot obtain a default solely on the basis of his complaint 
but must introduce some evidence to support his claim.88 It is argu-
able that a party seeking relief from a constitutionally unenforceable 
default decree entered in such an action could be required to pro-
duce sufficient evidence to meet that introduced by the plaintiff 
prior to judgment. However, the attacking party who was absent 
from the hearing at which the evidence of his adversary was prof-
fered had no opportunity to object to its admissibility or to cross-
examine the witnesses who gave it. Unless he is afforded the chance 
32. See, e.g., Huff v. Flynn, 48 Ariz. 1175, 178, 60 P.2d 931, 933 (1936); Gutierrez v. 
Cuellar, 236 S.W. 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). 
33. See, e.g., Levasseur v. Roullman, 93 Mont. 552, 20 P.2d 250 (1933); Murphy v. 
Missouri & Kan. Land & Loan Co., 28 N.D. 519, 531, 149 N.W. 957, 961 (1914). Contra, 
Barton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935). 
Recent Developments
to do so in the later proceeding, he is clearly not in the same posi-
tion he would have occupied in the original proceeding.34
Those courts which find their previous practices curtailed by
the doctrine of the principal case can take comfort in the fact that
modem summary judgment procedure is available by which one
party to any new trial following the annulment of a constitutionally
unenforceable judgment can determine whether the contentions of
his adversary really present a material issue of fact-the very ques-
tion supposedly answered by deviating from the strict interpretation
of the test for a meritorious defense.35
34. There is some authority suggesting that a party to a non-criminal proceeding
who has been deprived of an opportunity to challenge the evidence or witnesses used
against him may have been denied due process of law. See ICC v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
35. See generally 3 BARRON & HoLrzorF, FEDERAL PRAaTxcE & PRocEURE § 1231
(Rules ed. 1958); note 24 supra.
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